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ABSTRACT
Prediction problems in finance go beyond estimating the unknown parameters of a model (e.g of
expected returns). This is because such a model would have to include parameters governing the
market participants’ propensity to change their opinions on the validity of that model. This leads to
a well–known circular situation characteristic of financial markets, where participants collectively
create the future they wish to estimate. In this paper, we introduce a framework for organizing
multiple expectation models and study the conditions under which they are adopted by a majority of
market participants.
1 Introduction
When applying machine learning to the natural or the social sciences the difference is in the level at which patterns are
identified and exploited: in natural science, data may be reproduced through repeated probing or experiments, which
leads to its classification as an “exact” science. In social science, we study the possibly infinite ways in which people
behave given the data. As an example, a natural scientist might be interested in estimating the fill level of oil reservoirs
using satellite images, while a social scientist, in particular in the field of finance, worries about how the knowledge
about fill levels affects investors’ estimates of the scarcity of the commodity. In the latter case, it cannot be assumed
that fill levels alone determine the trading levels of oil but other events, e.g. geopolitics may at the same time impact
the future supply of oil. The real question is what we believe the majority of other market participants will regard as
the relevant piece of information. The financial market is a beauty contest in which majorities decide on the winner,
and objective criteria are only the contestants in a competition for the attention of investors [1].
Attempts have been made in the economic literature to get around the complexity arising from the self–referential
nature of financial markets. An influential concept was the hypothesis put forward by Muth [2] that the agents’
predictions of future payoffs are not systematically wrong: agents are capable of forming rational expectations which
take all available information into account. Grossmann [3] proposes the idea that prices aggregate information that is
initially dispersed across investors. The assumption is that the true (fundamental) price is known to some but not all
market participants leading to an information asymmetry. The asymmetry is reduced when participants observe prices
which convey information about the aggregate demand and, from there, the true price of a traded asset. Even though
this inference may be too complicated to be carried out by the average market participant, market forces act as if this
was the average behavior as traders with incorrect estimates would incur losses and would eventually be driven out
of the market. Only traders with correct beliefs survive. This is referred to as the market selection argument for the
information efficiency of prices [4].
The general viewpoint adopted by the efficient market hypothesis is that the “true” (fundamental) value of an asset
is somehow exogenously given and remains unchanged during the process of price discovery. Efficiency means that
traded prices reveal everything there is to be known about the security. Even if we accept the idea of a true value we
find that in practice, i.e. over finite investment horizons, value is relative as the price obtained when selling a security
at some future instant of time will be set by the aggregate demand at that instant. This leads to the problem of having
to determine what others will be ready to pay at the end of our investment period.
A different viewpoint is the following: Fundamental value cannot exist ex ante if it depends on the choices of the
security market itself. The payoff of assets to investors depends on future states of the economy. All investors face
∗mail: matthias.feiler@lgt.com, thibaut ajdler@lgt.com
ar
X
iv
:1
90
6.
03
20
1v
2 
 [q
-fi
n.G
N]
  1
7 A
ug
 20
19
Learning from Others in the Financial Market A PREPRINT
the same problem of not knowing these states and, more importantly, the impact of these states on the decisions of
other investors. As a result, estimates about the future are “irreducibly subjective” [5], they are no more than opinions.
“Investors have to position themselves relative to the market opinion and by doing so they bring it to life” [ibid.].
Fundamental value is co–constructed in a framework where multiple assessments about future payoffs compete to
become the dominant way of interpreting current events.
When agents factor in the presence of other agents who also try to forecast the value of the asset we potentially run into
an infinite regress problem [6]. Allen, Morris and Shin [7] study the problem in a homogeneous market populated by
Bayesian rational agents and find that there is a bias towards prior information, when agents forecast the forecasts of
others. In a recent dicussion paper, Beckert argues that decision–making is instead anchored in imagined, “fictional”
depictions of future outcomes which may include genuine novelty. Such “imagineries can help fashion shared visions
and social narratives that coordinate future–oriented beliefs” [8]. But if the value of an asset depends on what the
market as a whole thinks and the thinking, in turn, depends on its un–observable imaginative capacity, is financial
forecasting possible at all?
Practical experience indicates that investors’ expectations are guided by conventions, i.e. generally accepted ideas or
leading paradigms in which the market operates. The aim of this paper is to introduce a framework for identifying
the prevailing market convention. This may be seen as the narrative adopted by a majority of investors when forming
expectations about future asset payoffs. For example, an inverted US yield curve (long–term bond yields< short–term
yields) may be seen as a sign of an incumbent recession (narrative 1) or as a consequence of global demand for US
bonds in a low–yield world (narrative 2). To decide on one of the alternatives, we observe the statistical dependencies
of asset returns on available signals where each “signal” represents a simple forecasting model. The key intuition in
our approach is that, over some interval of time, the same model may be good for multiple different asset classes (i.e.
it is a “factor” behind the asset returns). This gives rise to a hierarchy of models which enables us to determine which
forecast is closest to the majority opinion.
2 Problem Statement
Suppose the uncertainty around a price target p∗ can be described by two scenarios p∗1 and p
∗
2. The question is which
of the two fair values is likely to come “true” over future trading sessions. If we knew all agents who support p∗1 or
p∗2 (as well as their susceptibility to change opinions) we could base our decision on the current relative importance
of the scenarios. If market participants are able to change their opinion (which they are) the effective “true” price of
the asset becomes a moving target. A standard way then would be to observe outcomes, i.e. traded prices p over time.
This would eventually reveal whether p was generated from a distribution centered around p∗1 or p
∗
2. However, this is
a slow process that relies on the assumption of an even lower switching rate between the two alternatives.
Our approach is to decide on the basis of the performance of related assets, i.e. to collect contemporaneous evidence
in a cross–section of returns. The rationale is that opinion formation around price targets is made for all investable
assets simultaneously using similar, overlapping arguments. We define the relation among assets indirectly using
common links they may have to the available signals. If multiple assets depend on similar signals they form a group.
As new data becomes available the signal dependencies are re–evaluated. If the group persists we conclude that the
common signal is still a valid one. If, on the other hand, the group members connect to an entirely new set of signals
we suspect that a regime shift has taken place and the dependencies –even of assets that still connect to the original
signal– may need to be updated. The signal sensitivities differ among assets and give rise to different speeds at which
the information contained in the signal is priced in. Within any group there will be members that are more susceptible
to a change in driving factors. The idea is to systematically use this information in order to select relevant signals for
the investment decision at hand.
Formal Description
Let x be an m–dimensional vector of asset returns and s be an n–dimensional vector of signals. Returns are obtained
at instant of time t+1 due to investments made at instant t. We assume that investors hold their positions over a period
[t, t+Q− 1], Q > 1. During that period they collect signals st to prepare for the following trading decision at t+Q.
For simplicity we assume that asset returns are binary variables x ∈ {0, 1}m where 1 corresponds to x > x¯ above
some threshold x¯ > 0. Likewise s ∈ {0, 1}n, which allows us to combine both continuous inputs s > s¯, s¯ > 0, as well
as discrete occurrences (e.g. of news articles). In summary, our market model consists of the multinomial distribution
p(Xt+1, St) where the decisions (based on St) and outcomes Xt+1 are separated by one discrete time–step. Notice
that we use the subscripts generically to denote any time instant t and its follower t+ 1. p(Xt+1, St) will be estimated
over multiple realizations {xτ+1, sτ}, τ ∈ [t, t + Q − 1]. The way signals are connected to outcomes depends on a
2
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common understanding of the relevance of the information contained in the available signals. This understanding may
vary over time.
As an example, a weak currency is in general good for the local equity market of a country as it makes the export sector
more competitive. However, the weakness may be an indication of political uncertainty in which case it must not be
used as a signal to invest. Depending on the relative importance assigned to the arguments the new price target is p∗2 or
p∗1. As discussed in more detail below, we approximate p(Xt+1, St) by a tree. We factorize the joint distribution using
a second–order approximation [9] with the additional constraint that target variables appear as leaves in the tree. This
is realized by not admitting edges that link target variables back to signals during the greedy search for the minimum
spanning tree.
Let S denote the subtree representing the distribution of signals p(St) (with Xt+1 marginalized out). We assume that
the co–dependence among signals is stationary, i.e. the structure of the tree and its edge weights are constant. Target
variables connect to S via edges corresponding to conditional probabilities p(Xt+1|St). Let X be the set of leaf nodes.
The problem addressed in this paper is that (while S is constant) the connection of X to S may change over time. We
write Tt = ct(X ,S) for the overall tree resulting from the connection of signal nodes and leaves at instant t. Note that
observations up to (xt, st−1) are used in the estimation of ct(·, ·).
Node xi and its peers
Suppose we are interested in the return of asset i Xi,t+1. In the above tree this corresponds to a leaf node xi. The
leaf distance given Tt is defined as an m-by-m matrix Dt(X ) = (d(t)ij) in which d(t)ij is the sum of edge weights
in the shortest path from leave node xi to xj . We define the neighborhood Nt(xi) = {xj | d(t)ij < θi} as the set
of nodes within a distance θi > 0 of xi. The point to note is that there are no direct connections among leaf nodes
but there will always be (at least) one signal node sl on the path between to leaves. These intermediary nodes change
as X re–wires to S. This means also that leaf nodes enter and exit the neighborhood Nt(xi) as new intermediaries
appear which affect the weights on the shortest path between leaves. We define the long–term neighborhood as
Nh(xi) = {xj |
∑
t∈h d(t)ij < θi} where h = [t − H + 1, t] and H is a long lookback horizon. In other words,
Nh(xi) contains the nodes, that are (statistically) close to xi over many tree generations.
The principal idea in this paper is the following: While the general tree Tt is constructed by maximizing the likelihood
of observations (or equivalently minimizing the sum of the edge weights between nodes) the connection of node xi
is such that its distance to Nh(xi) is minimized. The intuition behind this criterion is that it is reasonable to assume
that the distance among peers tends to revert to its long–term average as this corresponds to an average over many
different market phases and is therefore independent of the current dependencies (of returns on signals) given by Tt.
We claim that the best choice for xi is to connect to a signal node from which peers appear close according to Dt(X ).
Other than betting on mean–reversion (of peer distance) this also incorporates information about the signal choices of
a relevant sub–segment of the market as the objective is to stay close to all peers. We argue that this provides a way
for estimating the expectation models of others. We summarize:
Problem statement: Given a tree–shaped signal network S and a map ct(X ,S) in which all connections are determined
except the one from xi to S, determine the missing connection such that the distance from xi to Nh(xi) is minimized.
3 A tree representation of dependencies
In this paper we limit ourselves to a simplified representation of the joint distribution which is based on co–occurrences
of “ones”. Divided by the total number of observations this corresponds to a hit ratio of positive returns given signals
and is motivated by the fact that agents are more interested in finding profitable trade ideas (signals) than understanding
the statistical properties of the market.
3.1 Dependencies among signals
We assume that, prior to our experiment, a large number H of signal realizations are available. From this set, we
estimate the signal tree S. Given binary observation vectors s ∈ {0, 1}n we define the co–occurrence matrix
Ch = s¯
T s¯ (1)
where s¯ is the H × n matrix of observations (with H , the number of observations and n the number of signals).
Co-occurrences have an obvious interpretation as (negative) distances. In this paper, we define the edge weights as
dij = −χ2ij for any pair (i, j) of nodes with non–zero entry χij inCh. We compute the minimum spanning tree (MST)
as the network path that connects all nodes while minimizing the total edge weight. The total weight corresponds to
3
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the maximum sum of squared co–occurrences, a quantity that will be seen to relate to the spectrum of Ch. We use
Prim’s algorithm [10], [11] to obtain the adjacency matrix Sh of the MST. In a final step, we order Sh according to its
column sums. This puts nodes with a larger number of incoming edges to higher levels in the tree hierarchy.
Trees naturally embed levels of abstraction: parent nodes by definition correspond to events that co–occur with child
events which are themselves not directly connected. A typical situation is given by a set of stocks driven by a common
factor plus an idiosyncratic process. The factor is the parent that represents some (but not all) characteristics of the
stocks. At an even higher level, the performance of multiple factors may depend on the general macro–environment
so nodes such as gdp growth and consumer confidence would qualify as parents to the factor nodes. In summary, as
we move towards the root of the tree we expect to see more abstract variables. We wish to make this statement a bit
more precise:
Proposition 1: If a node in Ch is a parent, it is also closest to the 1st principal eigenvector of the sub-matrix associated
with its children.
For the proof, let sp be a parent node in the MST associated with Ch and let Q = s¯Tq s¯q be the sub–matrix associated
with its children. s¯q is the H ×m matrix of observations over m children nodes. Choose x ∈ Rm. Then s¯x = s¯qx
is a real–valued linear combination of binary occurrences in the children nodes. Its co–occurrence with s¯q is captured
by the vector qx = s¯Tq s¯x = Qx ∈ Rm. We will make use of the l2 norm of Q defined as
‖Q‖2 = max‖x‖2=1 ‖qx‖2 (2)
Proof of proposition 1: By definition, Q is non–negative and symmetric. This means that there exists a vector v ≥ 0
such thatQv = ρ(Q)v where ρ(Q) ≥ 0 is the spectral radius ofQ. It follows that the rhs in equation (2) is maximized
when x ∝ v. The sequence s¯v = s¯qv, in turn, is the first principal component of s¯q . By construction, the MST selects
sp as a parent iff
∑
q χ
2
pq = ‖s¯Tq s¯p‖22 is maximal among the available parent nodes (all nodes of S except the m
children). But this means that s¯p maximizes the same convex utility (2) as s¯v except on a discrete search space defined
by the tree S. 2
3.2 Attaching return nodes
While dependencies among signals are assumed to be stationary, the dependency of target variables on signals is time–
varying. Our objective is to detect which subset of signals is most relevant for an asset at a given instant of time. This
is motivated by the empirical observation that despite the theoretical relevance of multiple driving factors they are not
always simultaneously “at work”. This is well–recognized to be a consequence of the conscious attention allocation
by decision makers who are aware of their limited capacity to process all available information [12]. According to the
theory of rational inattention, decision–makers allocate optimally while taking the cost of information acquisition into
account. In this paper we argue, that the decision which information to process and which to ignore should be guided
by our peers’ information selection. The optimal attention allocation is the one that corresponds to the choice of the
majority of investors as this will ultimately drive the demand/ supply of an asset. Unlike the neo–classical approach
which involves solving a dynamic optimal control problem on the part of the investors we propose a simpler criterion
which we believe is closer to describing actual market behavior. Our main argument is that if processing capacity is
indeed limited it should not be spent on the problem of optimally selecting which information to follow. Our criterion
is that investors simply follow the choices of their peers.
In the present framework we associate with every asset i (a group of) investors trading that asset. At every instant,
the investors decide on important success factors for the asset they hold. We assume that this thought process can be
reconstructed by measuring the co–occurrence of positive returns xt and preceding “buy” signals st−1. Our measure-
ment starts at a particular instant t and includes Q realizations of signal–return pairs up to instant t. We combine these
measurements in a vector ξt = [xt st−1] ∈ {0, 1}m+n and obtain the co–occurrence matrix
Ct = ξ¯
T
t ξ¯t (3)
which is the “instantaneous” version of equation (1) where ξ¯t is the Q × (m + n) matrix of observations over the
short–run. m is the number of target variables to be attached to the signal tree Sh as follows.
Let SCt be the sub–matrix in Ct corresponding to the co–occurrence of signals. We replace SCt by the stationary
adjacency matrix Sh thereby effectively discarding all short–run relations that might appear in the data collected over
the last Q instants. By assumption the dependencies in SCt are stationary so any deviation from Sh has to be regarded
as non–informative. By contrast, the way the target variables depend on signals is allowed to change over time and we
assume that Q is sufficiently large for the measured co–occurrences to be statistically significant. Every target node
except the one of interest xi is attached to the signal to which it is closest in the short–run. This means that in every
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row xj , j 6= i the largest co–occurrence entry is chosen while all others are set to zero. Notice that in our construction,
there are no direct links among target nodes, which means that the sub–matrix XCt corresponding to asset returns in
Ct is set to zero. Also, for obvious reasons, we do not include any dependencies of signals on future returns in our
model, which means that the upper right m × n block is also set to zero. At this stage, the final tree Tt is almost
specified except for the crucial node xi which is the asset we want to trade.
3.3 Connecting the target node xi
The row associated with xi contains all short–run co-occurrences of returns i with signals. Instead of attaching xi to
the closest signal (like all the other nodes) we attach xi to the signal that allows xi to stay close the all its peers, i.e.
the members xj of Nt(xi), j 6= i. Due to the short–run nature of our data collection, xj may connect to very different
nodes in Sh over successive trading rounds. This partially reflects noise in the data but also potential early signs of
a regime change in the sense that a different signal is becoming relevant for predicting xj . Our idea is to exploit the
cross–section Nt(xi) in order to distinguish information from noise.
As described above, all return nodes in Xt+1 are connected to each other through the signal tree Sh. Connections
occur at all levels depending on the short–run co-dependence of returns on signals: some nodes xj share the same
parent node in the signal tree while others have a common ancestor at lower levels of the tree. In either case the
problem for xi is to choose a node in Sh which allows xi to connect to Nt(xi) on the shortest path. Before continuing
we introduce a useful device which allows us to identify pathways through the tree.
We define S¯h as the transpose of Sh in which all nonzero entries are set to 1 and let 1j be the m-dimensional binary
vector indicating the location of node i in Xt+1. We define the recursion
zl = S¯hzl+1 zL = 1j (4)
governing the (unique) transitions among tree levels, starting at the leaf level zL. Let Aj = {S¯h1j , S¯2h1j , . . . , S¯kh1j =
z0} be the ancestors of node xj , i.e. the set of parents visited until the root of the tree z0 is reached after k iterations.
We define
At(xi) =
⋃
j
Aj where j |xj ∈ Nt(xi) (5)
the set union of parent nodes visited by members of the neighborhood of xi at instant t. Notice that also Aj depends
on time as the initial condition zL will be different depending on where xj attaches to Sh given the short–run data Ct.
The index t is omitted for notational convenience. At(xi) defines a sub-tree of Sh with root αt. Let At,α be the set of
ancestors of αt within the complete tree Sh. We define
Ot(xi) = At(xi) \At,α (6)
This set corresponds to the sub–tree connecting the members of Nt(xi) to each other (including its root αt).
Proposition 2: The set Ot(xi) is an equivalence class with respect to the problem of finding the shortest path between
xi and the elements of the set Nt(xi).
Proof: Nodes in Nt(xi) are by construction endpoints of Sh. Since Sh is a tree, every edge leading to endpoints has
to be visited. This means that the distance to all nodes within the sub–tree Ot(xi) is equal to the sum of edge weights
of Ot(xi) independent to which of its members xi connects. 2
It follows that Ot(xi) can be regarded as a single node s∗ within Sh. The distance to s∗ is set equal to the minimum
weight of the edges from xi to any member of Ot(xi). The remaining problem is to find the shortest path from xi to
s∗ through the remaining tree of Sh i.e. using all the nodes in Sh \Ot(xi). This is a standard problem which we solve
using Dijkstra’s algorithm [13].
4 Empirical Study
We test the validity of our peer–cohesion hypothesis on a number of stock indices and currency exchange rates. The
objective is two–fold: first we aim at demonstrating that predictors perform better if they incorporate knowledge about
the signals of their peers. The second is to devise a trading strategy based on the predictions. This serves as another
way of demonstrating that the predictions contain extra information not available to individual nodes.
Our procedure is to (a) define relevant markets (stock indices or currencies) and group them, (b) compute predictions
of returns of group members and (c) take a (long–only) position if the signal node to which the member is connected
shows a “1”. Signal nodes consist mostly of macro–economic variables and will be introduced below. The situation we
have in mind is that group members periodically leave and return to the group, forming a kind of fluctuation around
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equilibrium group membership levels. The fluctuation can be explained by the asynchronous way in which group
members react to changes in the macro–economic environment.
As an example, if the dominant narrative puts trade wars in the foreground, the automotive sector may be the first to
price–in any progress or set–back in the matter while consumer stocks may follow. It should be noted that the role of
leader and follower within a peer group does depend on the narrative: if trade wars turn into currency wars (resulting in
a global pressure to keep rates down) then rate–sensitive sectors might be the ones leading market reactions. In general,
the role of leader or follower changes over time and is not known a priori, even though, in some cases, regional leaders
exist (US for developed markets, Brazil for LATAM etc.).
As part of our future research program, we hope to isolate markets where a ground truth leader is known and can be
used to test the precision of proposed scheme. In the experiments conducted so far, we did not notice any special role
of any particular market. This may be attributed to the fact that, for now, the peer group definition is done in an ad–hoc
fashion using traditional classifications such as defensive or cyclical stocks and developed vs. emerging (currency)
markets. The experiments reported below show that in many cases, peers help detect important regime–changes in the
market and cause the (long–only) strategy to stay out of the market during periods of crisis. An exhaustive analysis on
the peer group definition and how it affects the benefits to its members is currently work in progress.
We obtain data starting in Jan. 2002 from MSCI and Datastream. This allows us to measure a long–term signal co–
dependence from which we build the signal tree Sh. The estimation is carried out in–sample (using all available data)
which is still a weakness of the experiment although we argue that the estimation should be robust as the sample period
represents more than a full economic cycle. We come back to this point in the section on further research at the end of
the paper. Since the problem is one of signal selection we benchmark our results against two naive strategies. The first
benchmark is to attach the target node to the signal node corresponding to the largest entry in the co–occurrence matrix
without applying Dijkstra’s algorithm (benchmark: greedy). As a second reference, we include the performance of
the underlying market (benchmark: underlying), i.e. no attachment. The tree in this experiment is composed of the
signals and asset returns listed below. Across the paper, signals are denoted by the prefix while the target and the
peers start with the marker x.
4.1 Stocks: defensive and cyclical sectors
We present results obtained for the defensive and cyclical sectors in the US and European equity markets. The same
set of signals is used in both studies.
Defensive and cyclical sectors: signals
1. RV.BD : Revenue indicator in Germany
2. RV.US : Revenue indicator in US
3. MO.BD : Momentum indicator in Germany
4. MO.US : Momentum indicator in US
5. EMO.BD : Earnings Momentum indicator in Germany
6. EMO.US : Earnings Momentum indicator in US
7. UN.US : Unemployment indicator in US
8. NO.US : New orders indicator in US
9. ISM.BD : Manufacturing indicator in Germany
10. ISM.US : Manufacturing indicator in US
11. CF.BD : Confidence indicator in Germany
12. CF.US : Confidence indicator in US
13. STP.BD : Treasury steepness indicator in Germany
14. STP.US : Treasury steepness indicator in US
All “indicators” correspond to 1Y z–scores of the underlying variable. The sign of the node UN.US is inverted to
obtain a compatible set of indicators.
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Figure 1: Communication sector performance in Germany (node xCO.BD) with 20–days–ahead predictions based
on the indicated signal node
.
4.1.1 Defensive sectors
In this example, our target is the communication sector in Germany, denoted as xCO.BD. The set of peers includes
all German and US defensive sectors and is defined as follows:
Defensive peer group:
1. xUT.BD : Utilities sector in Germany
2. xUT.US : Utilities sector in US
3. xCO.BD : Communication sector in Germany
4. xCO.US : Communication sector in US
5. xHC.BD : Health care sector in Germany
6. xHC.US : Health care sector in US
7. xCS.BD : Consumer staples sector in Germany
8. xCS.US : Consumer staples sector in US
The prediction resulting from peer–cohesion is presented in Figure 1. The cumulative return of our target is shown
in blue. Every 20 days, we re–estimate the attachment of our target to the signal tree as described in section 3.3. For
each period, we show the 20–days–ahead prediction in red as well as the name of the signal node (model) used for
the prediction. The magnitude of the prediction is based on equalizing the (200 days trailing) volatility of the target
and the signal. The investment strategy derived from the signals switches between a long–position in the underlying
market or cash. At every instant, our target market connects to a node sj which is then evaluated. If sj = 1, a position
is entered else we do not invest. While the signal tree is the same for every target market, the attachment points sj are
different and depend on the cost for a target node to be close to its peers. We estimate the attachment of our target to
the tree based on a rolling window of 200 days in steps of 20 days. Figure 2 displays the cumulative profit and loss
7
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Figure 2: Performance of the communication sector in Germany. The chart shows the performance of the proposed
“adaptive” scheme as compared to the benchmarks (top), the year on year prediction compared to the underlying
(middle) and the evolution of the time–varying attachment points of the strategy as compared to a greedy attachment
.
of the resulting adaptive investment strategy. The corresponding switching sequence is reported in the lower part of
the chart. The middle chart compares the prediction against the actual, realized year–on–year return. The correlation
turns out to be 0.51. To further illustrate the mechanism of the proposed strategy, we provide a more detailed study
of the example in Figure 3. We consider the period of Feb. 2006 where the adaptive strategy performs well while the
greedy version looses. In the lower chart of Figure 3, it can be seen that in Feb. 2006, both the greedy and the adaptive
versions coincide and connect to the node CF.US. In mid Feb. 2006, the adaptive version connects to RV.US while
the greedy version stays at CF.US. The (minimum spanning) trees before and after the switch are seen in Figs.9a and
9b: at the beginning of the month xCO.BD connects to CF.US which also corresponds to the simple shortest path
(without awareness of the peer group). This is the situation in Fig.9a. Later that month, we see (Fig.9b) that a new
shortest path connects our target to RV.US while the greedy algorithm remains connected to CF.US as shown by the
8
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_RV.US
Figure 3: Zoom on the Performance in 2006
.
dotted line. Note that this result is in–line with expectations since some peers also connect to RV.US as an early sign
of a new orientation of the peer group. The algorithm causes a re–wiring of the connection enabling the target node
to include new information beyond CF.US with which it continues to have the highest direct (greedy) co–occurrence.
This is precisely the kind of group information transfer that we are exploring in this paper. The thickness of the edges
represent the strength of the co–occurrences.
4.1.2 Cyclical sectors
We now proceed to a similar study for the cyclical sectors.
Cyclical peer group:
1. xIN.BD : Industrials sector in Germany
2. xIN.US : Industrials sector in US
3. xCD.BD : Consumer discretionary sector in Germany
4. xCD.US : Consumer discretionary sector in US
5. xMA.BD : Materials sector in Germany
9
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_EMO.US
_EMO.BD_RV.US
_MO.US
_RV.BDxCS.BD
_UN.US
xHC.BD
_STP .US
_STP .BD xCS.US xHC.US
_NO.US
xUT.BD
xCO.US
_ISM.BD _ISM.US
_MO.BD
_CF.US
xCO.BD xUT.US
_CF.BD
(a)
_CF.US_EMO.BD _NO.US_RV.US
xUT.US xCS.BD xCO.BD xUT.BD xHC.US xCO.US
_STP .US
_RV.BD xCS.US_STP .BDxHC.BD
_MO.BD
_ISM.US_ISM.BD
_MO.US
_UN.US_EMO.US
_CF.BD
(b)
Figure 4: Minimum spanning trees estimated with target note attached during the period around Feb 2006.
6. xMA.US : Materials care sector in US
7. xIT.BD : Information technology sector in Germany
10
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8. xIT.US : Information technology sector in US
Our target is the industrial sector in the US xIN.US. The year on year prediction in Fig.6 presents a correlation of .42
with the underlying. Fig.5 provides a detailed view of the 20–day predictions and the name of the forecasting model
from which they are derived.
Figure 5: Industrials performance in the U.S. (node xIN.US) with 20–days–ahead predictions based on the indicated
signal node
.
Fig.7 provides some instructive details on the strategy performance during the great financial crisis. The adaptive
scheme stays in cash because the signal coming from ISM.US turns negative. The tree corresponding to this period is
shown in Fig. 8. Later in 2008, our target connects to CF.US which also causes the strategy to stay in cash and further
out–perform the outright long strategy. In the following year, the adaptive strategy manages to catch the rebound by
connecting to STP.BD and subsequently to RV.US which both turn positive.
The results provide some support for the adaptive (“learning from others”) approach but are by no means exhaustive.
It seems that following peers adds value when choosing a forecasting model. The robustness of the result and its
dependence on critical parameters, such as the choice of the peer group, the lookback horizons used for the indicators
and the estimation of co–occurrences need to be investigated further. As mentioned above, this is currently work in
progress.
4.2 Currencies: GBP vs. USD
As an illustration of the universality of the approach, we study a similar prediction task for the GBPUSD currency
pair. The peer group in this case is composed of some important European countries:
GBP peer group:
1. xGB2 : British Pound against the USD spot return
2. xEU2 : Euro against the USD spot return
3. xCH2 : Swiss Franc against the USD spot return
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Figure 6: Performance of the industrial sector in the US. The chart shows the performance of the proposed “adaptive”
scheme as compared to the benchmarks (top), the year–on–year prediction compared to the underlying (middle) and
the evolution of the time–varying attachment points of the strategy as compared to a greedy attachment
.
The set of signals consists of index returns and news data obtained from our proprietary news database 2. The news
signals count keywords in a corpus of financial blogs and news articles.
1. WO : MSCI World price return
2. CL : Crude Oil price return
3. GC : Gold price return
4. EM : MSCI emerging markets price return
5. N.TW: News–based “trade war” indicator
6. N.BX: News–based “brexit” indicator
2Daily data obtained from ∼100 pre–defined RSS feeds since March 2015.
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Figure 7: Zoom on the Performance in 2008
.
7. N.BD: News–based “dovish (referring to monetary policy)” indicator
In addition we include some country specific indicators as follows:
1. YI (Carry): the difference between the money market deposit rate of a country vs. the US deposit rate
2. DYI (Change of Carry): the difference between the YI signal now and 60 days ago
3. MO (Momentum): average spot return of a currency where the indicator is 1 if 〈rspot〉100 > 0 and 〈·〉100 is
the arithmetic average over 100 days
4. IV (Implied Vol): implied volatility of a currency. The higher the implied vol, the more volatility is expected
by market participants trading in options. The signal is obtained by applying a 1Y z–score on IV and invert
the sign
We compare the results with and without news in Fig. 9a and 9b. It can be seen that the news signals, if available, are
quite often selected as attachment nodes.
5 Further directions
Apart from investigating peer cohesion effects across different markets and time–scales, the authors believe that the
assumption on the stationarity of Sh can be relaxed. This would also be of practical relevance as Sh could be estimated
13
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_UN.US
_CF.US
xCD.BD
_CF.BD
_MO.BD
_MO.US
xIT.BD
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xIT.USxIN.USxMA.BD xMA.US
xIN.BD
_RV.BD _STP .BD
_EMO.BD
_EMO.US
_NO.US
_STP .US
xCD.US _RV.US
Figure 8: xIN.US tree at the beginning of 2008
.
on trailing data, possibly on an expanding window as more data becomes available. The associated (slow) time-
variation in Sh would give rise to very interesting situations where peer groups may entirely be torn apart due to a
change in the co–dependence structure of signal nodes that connected them.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 9: Cumulative returns and predictions over time (a) without news (b) with news signals.
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